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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appeal from the Ruling on Appeal made by Douglas 
L Cornaby, District Judge presiding, in the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Davis, 
State of Utah; and Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the 
Ruling on Appeal in the Utah Court of Appeals in and for the 
State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The court below affirmed the verdict and judgment of 
the trial court. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict 
and judgment of the trial court, to-wit: The District Court 
of the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Davis, 
State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of conviction and restoration of costs. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The officers in this case each gave different opinions 
as to the strength of the odor of alcohol on the petitioner's 
breath during the interrogation/arrest stages of this case in 
that Sergeant Kennepohl, the first officer to contact the 
petitioner, said that he finally got a fairly strong odor when 
the petitioner had opened the trunk of his vehicle (T-23), 
while Officer Slater said it was a medium odor (T-52) and 
Officer Schilling stated it was a faint odor - and he was 
close to the petitioner and was the same height (T-8R). 
Petitioner Olson was deprived of his liberty on 
the morning of October 13, 1985, at approximately 2:00 a.m., 
when Sergeant David Kennepohl took him into custody and turned 
him over to Officer Randy Slater for interrogation pertaining 
to the accusation of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol 
(T-24) . 
Petitioner Olson was interrogated without the right 
to counsel, and the evidence collected and testimony obtained 
was used against him to obtain a conviction the crime of 
Driving While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor and 
Drugs, in violation of 41-6-44 of the Clearfield City Code, a 
Class B misdemeanor. That at the time and place aforesaid 
(on October 13, 1985, in the City of Clearfield, County of 
Davis, State of Utah), the petitioner did operate and/or 
have actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this 
State while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, to 
a degree which rendered the defendant incapable of safely 
driving said vehicle (T-7) (Information and Verdict). 
Petitioner Olson was first observed by Sergeant 
David Kennepohl at approximate 1:50 a.m., while Kennepohl 
was Northbound at 1500 South in Clearfield, Davis County, 
Utah (T-16). 
Sergeant Kennepohl was on SR-126, the main highway 
that runs from Layton to Sunset through Clearfield, Utah (T-26). 
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The posted speed is 45 miles per .hour (T-16,17). 
The road conditions were dry (T-16). 
Sergeant Kennepohl stated that he first observed 
the Olson vehicle when it pulled off the right-hand side of 
the road going Southbound on a four-lane highway (T-16). He 
then stated that the Olson vehicle made a "U" turn and headed 
Northbound from about 1150 South; he stated that as he began 
to catch up, the Olson vehicle accelerated (T-17, T-27). 
Kennepohl stated he could not say for sure whether 
the Olson vehicle came to a complete stop (T-17). He also 
stated that Mr. Olson, upon completing the "U" turn, went 
from the outside lane to the inside lane (T-17). He also 
stated that Mr. Olson was riding the yellow line with his 
left rear wheel (T-17). Sergeant Kennepohl said he observed 
the left rear wheel over the yellow line from a distance of 
two or three blocks some distance back (T-18). He stated 
that the lines were clear (T-18)o He said he actually 
observed the wheel over the yellow line in certain places 
(T-18). He also stated that there were no street lights 
where the "U" turn was made (T-19). 
Sergeant Kennepohl said he started to catch up to 
Mr. Olson at 200 South because Mr. Olson had stopped for a 
red light (T-19). Sergeant Kennepohl stated that as he 
approached Mr. Olson at 200 South, the light turned green 
and Mr. Olson accelerated at a high rate of speed, and that 
as he went through 300 North, he was doing 60 miles per hour 
and Mr. Olson was going even faster and was still pulling 
away from him (T-19). Sergeant Kennepohl then said that he 
turned on his overhead lights while going 60 miles per hour 
in downtown Clearfield, Utah, with light traffic, and did 
not turn his siren on for an additional two blocks at 500 
North, and that Mr. Olson came to a full stop at 650 North 
where he had stopped at a red light at the intersection (T-19, 
T-20). Sergeant Kennepohl said he was never able to get 
close enough to the Olson vehicle to pace it (T-19). 
Sergeant Kennepohl asked him for his drivers 
license (T-21). He told Kennepohl it was in the trunk 
(T-22). Mr. Olson went to the trunk, opened it with a key, 
looked in the trunk, and then said that the bag was not 
there (T-22, T-35). Kennepohl said he did not notice whether 
he had more than one key or if he had shut off the ignition 
and removed the key from the car (T-35). 
Kennepohl said at the time Mr. Olson was at the 
trunk, he smelled a fairly strong odor of alcoholic beverage 
on his breath (T-23) and noticed that his eyes were a little 
glassy (T-23). 
Kennepohl said Mr. Olson was coherent (T-23). 
Kennepohl asked for a registration, and Mr. Olson got in the 
car to find it (T-23, T-24). 
Sergeant Kennepohl turned the scene over to Officer 
Slater and told him it was a good possibility (T-25). 
Sergeant Kennepohl said he notified Officer Slater 
that he was following a possible DUI when he was at 700 
South (T-30). Sergeant Kennepohl said that the only thing 
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that made him think that he had a possible DUI was the 
increased speed and the riding of the yellow line (T-30). 
Officer Slater was the designated DUI investiga-
tion officer for the Clearfield City Police Department (T-42) 
but had received no advanced training (T-42, T-74, T-75). 
Officer Slater asked Mr. Olson to perform certain actions 
which included oral statements to be made by Mr. Olson in 
response to questions and instructions given by Officer 
Slater before he was told he had a right to counsel or that 
he could not be compelled to give evidence against himself 
during custodial interrogation by Officer Slater. Officer 
Slater requested Mr. Olson to perform and answer questions or 
make statements during the performance (T-4 5). 
Officer Slater told Mr. Olson his license would be 
taken from him if he took the chemical test (T-75). Officer 
Slater also told him it would be taken away if he refused to 
take the chemical test (T-69, T-70, T-71). 
Officer Slater told Mr. Olson he would like him to 
submit to a chemical test, and Mr. Olson agreed to take the 
test (T-54). 
Officer Slater put handcuffs on Mr. Olson and put 
him in his patrol car (T-50). 
On October 13, 198 5, Mr. Olson was released on 
bail. On October 18, 1985, Mr. Olson was arraigned before 
the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen, Clearfield Circuit 
Court Judge, on charges of DUI, Speeding, and No License 
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in Possession, to which Mr. Olson plead "not guilty" to all 
of the charges. 
The trial was held on January 23, 1986, where Mr. 
Olson was convicted of the single charge of Driving While 
Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquors and/or Drugs, in 
violation of 41-6-44 of the Clearfield City Code. 
Mr. Olson appealed his conviction to the Second 
District Court, but his attorney would not help him do so. 
He hired a new attorney, and he also refused to attend oral 
arguments and left Mr. Olson without counsel at a critical 
stage of his appeal. 
Mr. Olson applied for an extension of time in which 
to obtain new counsel, but his motion was denied by District 
Judge Douglas L Cornaby on April 17, 1986, and the oral 
arguments were held without counsel present for Mr. Olson. 
On May 30, 1986, Judge Cornaby entered a Ruling on 
Appeal affirming the judgment and verdict of the trial court 
and returned the file to the Clearfield Department of the 
Fourth Circuit Court with instructions to execute the sentence, 
Mr. Olson informed the Clearfield Circuit Court 
that he was making an appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah, 
and he then tiled a Notice of Appeal with the Davis County 
District Court and delivered a copy of it to the Clearfield 
Circuit Court; he was told by Circuit Court Judge Van Wagenen 
that he did not have anymore rights to appeal and that the 
sentence would be executed. 
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Mr. Olson is raising the same issues on appeal in 
the Supreme Court that he raised in the District Court. They 
concern the denial of due process of law, denial of counsel at 
critical stages of the case, and being compelled to give 
evidence against himself in the absence of counsel, including 
oral or verbal statements, and was forced to file his own 
appeal because counsel refused to help him, prejudice by the 
trial court judge in regard to his refusal to plea bargain 
to a lesser charge of Reckless Driving, evidence should have 
been excluded that was included which prejudiced the jury, 
and essentially compelled the defendant to testify against 
himself by means of a surreptitious recording while he was 
interrogated while under arrest, and denied the benefit of 
counsel. The jury was composed of a juror who could be 
challenged for impartiality because of a death in his family 
caused by a drunk driver. 
The surreptitious recording was only partially 
introduced as testimony of the defendant and prejudiced the 
jury. Petitioner was denied access to the trial tapes and, in 
particular, he could not review the Police Department's 
surreptitious tape in preparing for his appeals herein 
because it was transmitted with the record but was sealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner Olson was deprived of his Constitu-
tional rights to counsel, trial by an impartial jury, from 
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being compelled to give evidence against himself in the 
absence of counsel, and his evidence so taken was used against 
him to convict him of a crime he did not commit, by use of 
unlawful and un-Constitutional means. 
The petitioner has a right to counsel under the 
provisions of both the Constitution of the United States and 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, and such counsel was 
denied at critical times and stages of his in-custody/under 
arrest interrogation, and virtually all of the evidence 
presented against the petitioner was obtained from his own 
mouth while in such custody, and he was not allowed to have 
counsel before making the decision to have to submit to a 
chemical test in a situation where he was told by the inter-
rogating officer that if he took the test, he would lose his 
license and if he refused €o take the test, he would lose his 
license, and it was based on the fact that he was threatened 
with the loss of his license based on either decision he made 
and that he was not allowed to have counsel before making 
the decision, and before he was given his rights under the 
Miranda rule. Even after he said he would not answer ques-
tions without an attorney present or give evidence against 
himself, he was denied his rights to remain silent and have 
the assistance of counsel in making that critical decision. 
He was convicted before trial regardless of what choice he 
made. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT AND DISTRICT COURT BOTH 
COMMITTED ERROR BY RULING THAT EVIDENCE 
REGARDING APPELLANT'S GIVING EVIDENCE 
AGAINST HIMSELF IN ABSENCE OF COUNSEL WAS 
ADMISSIBLE WHEN HE HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED 
COUNSEL BEFORE OR AFTER HE WARNED OF HIS 
RIGHTS. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
EXCLUDED. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS 
DECIDED AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW 
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN BUT SHOULD BE SETTLED 
BY THIS COURT. 
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah provides that no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The 
petitioner was so deprived of his liberty without due process 
of law and was held to answer for a crime without his right 
to counsel being present at every critical stage of the prose-
cution. The Utah Supreme Court ruled in Hunter v. Dorius, 
23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P.2d 877 (1969) as follows: 
Driver was held not to have refused 
to submit to test where he was in-
formed of his rights and the conse-
quences of his refusal at 9:48 o'clock 
but could not reach his attorney until 
shortly after 10 ofclock at which time 
he consented, but by then the police 
officer refused to perform the test. 
Further, along this line the Kansas Court of Appeals 
ruled in State v. Bristor, 682 P.2d 122 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) 
as follows: 
The administration of a blood alcohol 
test is a "critical stage" in the 
prosecution of a DUI case and the 
defendant must have the opportunity 
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to consult with an attorney as to 
whether to take the test or not. How-
ever, the right to counsel is a limited 
right. The defendant cannot be allowed 
to abuse the right in a manner which 
would unduly delay or unreasonably 
interfere with the administration of 
the test. 
In the Sites v. State case, 481 A.2d 192 (Md. Ct. 
App. 1984), the court ruled as follows: 
Chemical test is a "critical stage" 
and defendant is entitled to consult 
with an attorney before deciding 
whether or not to submit to a chemical 
test as long as such attempted com-
munication will not interfere with the 
timely administration of the test. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT, CLEARFIELD CITY, IS CLEARLY 
IN DEFAULT IN THE FOLLOWING REGARDS: 
1. They did not appear for oral arguments. 
2. They did not file a Plaintiff-Respondent's 
Brief. 
POINT III 
ONE MALE MEMBER OF THE JURY AT THE 
CLEARFIELD CIRCUIT COURT STATED HE HAD A 
MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY KILLED BY A DRUNK 
DRIVER. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN 
IMPARTIAL JURY. 
POINT IV 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER TESTIFIED AT THE 
TRIAL UNFACTUAL STATEMENTS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That he saw the rear tire of the vehicle over 
the line on the highway from a distance of approximately three 
blocks to a quarter of a mile from the petitioner's vehicle, 
which is impossible. 
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2. That the petitioner was speeding from where 
the officer said he first saw petitioner to where officer 
stopped him. If the officer was going 65 miles per hour, as 
he stated and the petitioner was going the speed limit, they 
would have come together where the officer stopped the 
petitioner. 
3. That there was a well lighted area, with a 
street light on each corner, where the field sobriety test 
was administered. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioner in this case was deprived of his 
Constitutional right to due process of law under both the Utah 
and the United States Constitution and was put in the unten-
able position of being compelled to be a witness against 
himself and to give evidence against himself without first 
having the benefit of counsel and was not given equal protec-
tion of the law and was deprived of his liberty by persons 
acting in violation of the Constitution of the United States 
and of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and compelled 
evidence from him and denied him counsel at critical stages 
of the prosecution and also by a judge in the appeal of the 
case so that the petitioner was left to his own imagination 
and devices in order to perfect his appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah. The conviction should be 
reversed, and the petitioner should be compensated for his 
fine and time in which he was deprived of his liberty. 
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The petitioner hereby respectfully requests that 
this Court grant him a one-year extension of time within which 
to perfect a proper Brief and within which to demand a 
responsive Brief from the respondent herein, and for the 
further reason that petitioner intends to properly present 
the following facts in said Brief: 
1. Being denied equal protection of the law. 
2. Illegal reading of my Miranda card rights. 
3. Failure of Officer Von Collins to appear in 
court for testimony. 
4. Violation of my Sixth Amendment rights, due to 
inadequate, incompetent, and unethical counsel. 
5. Illegal sentencing. 
6. Judge was prejudice. 
7. Juror was prejudice. 
8. Fact tape that was obtained into evidence should 
have been totally excluded or totally admitted. 
9. No access to tape before trial. 
10. Field test Officer Slater used to determine I 
was driving under the influence has no scientific validity. 
11. Question qualification Officer Schilling has in 
giving mystagmas test. 
12. Before Officer Slater asked petitioner to take 
mystagmas test, he did not inform petitioner he had the right 
to remain silent and the right not to incriminate himself, and 
the right to an attorney before petitioner answered any questions. 
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13. Implied consent law which is civil in nature and 
separate from criminal charges. 
14. Denied request that the testimony regarding 
questions beyond Officer Slater asking petitioner to take 
mystagmas test be restricted. 
15. Officer Slater did not advise petitioner 
depending on his performance in the tests that he may be 
allowed to drive away from the scene. 
16. Tape was taken without petitioner's knowledge 
surreptiously, and that poses an unfair advantage. Peti-
tioner clearly, from the very beginning, asked for an attorney 
to be present. Officer Slater subsequently asked petitioner 
if he was going to answer questions even after the officer had 
been fully advised that petitioner did not intend to answer 
any questions without an attorney. 
17. Judge reason for allowing tape as evidence for 
the reason that the officer did not continue in any way to 
ask questions. Tape should have been excluded. Officer Slatter 
did continue to ask questions about the DUI. 
18. Officer Slater refused to get petitioner's 
medication after arrest that petitioner took daily. Officer 
Slater put petitioner in a life threatening situation. This 
medication was in the petitioner's car, and he informed Officer 
Slater of same. He was disabled with a bad heart and needed 
three medications each day. Officer was informed that peti-
tioner was sick at that time and needed his medication and 
Cepotacal mouthwash was in the front seat of petitioner's car. 
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19. Petitioner was totally cooperative until point 
after arrest and Officer Slater had refused to get petitioner 
his three medications that he took daily, which medications 
were in petitioner's car with his name and the Veterans 
Hospital written on the label. 
20. The Davis County Jail refused to seek medical 
attention or let the petitioner see a doctor, and he was held 
over 18 hours without a phone call permitted him for five hours. 
21. Officer Kennepohl was without observing any 
reason to assume petitioner was driving under the influence 
or anything of that sort and not to assume petitioner drunk, 
and should have not involved seven officers to involve him. 
22. Prosecution burden proving beyong a reasonable 
doubt had a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or greater 
by weight. Prosecution had no proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
23. On impound, why was not all medication and alcohol 
impounded as evidence? 
24. Officer Slater stated unfactual statements under 
oath numerous times during trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of September, 1987. 
FRANCHOT OLSON,'PETITIONER 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered the 
following on this 4th day of September, 1987: Four copies 
of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari (with one 
bearing my original signature) to STEVE VANDERLINDEN, 
Clearfield City Attorney, attorney for respondent, 140 East 
Center Street/ Clearfield, Utah? and ten copies of the 
said Petition for Writ of Certiorari (with one bearing my 
original signature) to the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's 
Office, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
'RANCHOT OLSON 
n Propria Persona 
'etitioner 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ET I I C H 
ooOoo 
AUG 51987 
Clearfield City, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Franchot Olson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Billings, Davidson and Garff 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 860290-CA 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Franchot Olson appeals his conviction of 
driving while intoxicated, in violation of a Clearfield City 
Ordinance. His appeal was submitted to the Court on 
appellant's brief only because respondent failed to file a 
brief. R. Utah Ct. App. 26(c) and 29(c). 
Appellant argues that he was compelled to give evidence 
against himself by taking field sobriety tests without his 
attorney being present, in derogation of his rights under the 
fifth and sixth amendments of the U.S. Constitution. We have 
examined this contention and consider it to be wholly without 
merit. Salt Lake Citv v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983); 
cf. American Fork Citv v. Crosarove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985); 
Caveness v. Cox. 598 P.2d 349, 354 (Utah 1979); see also. South 
Dakota v. Neville. 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Nor was the admission of his 
refusal to submit to alcohol breath test a violation of 
defendant's right against self incrimination. Sandy Citv v. 
Larson, 51 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1987). 
We have also considered the other contentions that are 
suggested in appellant's brief, but are not properly argued, 
and find each one equally without merit• 
The conviction is affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION by depositing the same in 
the United States mail/ postage prepaid to the following: 
Franchot L. Olson 
145 North 4th West 
Logan, UT 84321 
Steve Vanderlinden 
Clearfield City Attorney's Office 
133 South State 
Clearfield, UT 84015 
Honorable Douglas Cornaby 
District Court Judge 
City and County Building 
Farmington, UT 84025 
DATED this 5th day of August, 1987. 
fvnv 1 'uu 
Karen Bean 
Case Management Clerk 
